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I. Introduction
There is a perennial problem affecting Adorno’s philosophy. It seems to lack the 
resources to account for the normativity it contains. In an influential article, Finlayson 
has analyzed this problem and offered an intriguing solution to it.1 According to 
Finlayson, Adorno subscribes to a normative ethics, but this normative commitment is 
in tension with his view that we cannot know the good or any positive values (in short, 
with his negativism). Finlayson argues that by drawing only on resources within 
Adorno’s philosophy, it is, however, possible to provide access to a kind of good which 
is suitable as a normative basis for his ethics (namely, the good involved in the 
experiences of having ineffable insights), and this is the best way to resolve the tension 
between Adorno’s normative commitment and his negativism. 
In this paper, I show that this proposal is unsuitable as (1) a normative basis of 
Adorno’s ethics and also as (2) an explanation of the possibility of people acting according to this 
ethics. I end by outlining an alternative solution and by defending it against Finlayson's objections. 
II. Finlayson  ’s reconstruction of Adorno’s ethics  
According to Finlayson, Adorno subscribes to an “ethics of resistance.”2 This ethics is a normative 
ethics insofar as it tells us how we should live in the late capitalist social world. It also provides a 
rationale for why we should live in the way it requires us to live. This rationale takes the form of a 
“new categorical imperative”, which demands of us to arrange our “thoughts and actions so that 
Auschwitz will not repeat itself.”3 In particular, this involves the requirement to resist the social 
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1 J.G. Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” European Journal of Philosophy 10.1 (April 2002): 1–
25. 
2 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 5f.
3 T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1966), p. 358/translated as Negative Dialectics by 
E.B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 365. Henceforth “ND.”
2world we live in—for this social world is radically evil. This evil is exemplified in the events to 
which Adorno refers by using the name “Auschwitz”, but it is not restricted to these events. Just the 
opposite: according to Finlayson’s reconstruction of Adorno’s views, the whole social world and 
the model of rationality on which it is built are evil root and branch,4 and deserve to be resisted in 
virtue of this. 
It is one of the merits of Finlayson’s article that he tries to reconstruct in more detail 
what Adorno’s ethics of resistance requires of us.5 According to this reconstruction, we should 
adopt “(...) various strategies of self-conscious non-cooperation with institutionalized forms of 
social unfreedom and with prevailing norms and values.”6 Moreover, it is constitutive of a life of 
resistance to develop and exercise certain dispositions and corresponding modes of behavior which 
Finlayson calls “virtues.”7 Of these, there are three: (I) “autonomy” (as Finlayson translates 
“Mündigkeit”), that is, the “capacity to take a critical stance and to act on it”; (II) “humility” (as he 
translates “Bescheidenheit”), that is, “consciousness of one’s own fallibility” and (III) “affection”, 
that is, the “capacity to be moved by (...) the fate of others.”8 These virtues are directly related to 
what the New Categorical Imperative requires of us. It was the absence of affection, humility and 
autonomy and the prevalence of the opposite character traits (submission to authority, self-
certainty, and bourgeois coldness) which made Auschwitz possible. Conversely, a sufficiently 
widespread practice of the three virtues might prevent its reoccurrence—there is no guarantee that it 
will, but the individual exercising these virtues will at least be unlikely to partake directly in such 
events. However, deploying the three virtues successfully requires that they are developed and 
exercised together. For example, autonomy needs to be kept in check by humility, for otherwise it 
4 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 2-4.
5 For a slightly different reconstruction of Adorno’s ethics, see my “Moral Philosophy,” in D. Cook (ed.), Adorno – 
Key Concepts (London: Acumen, 2008), Ch. 9.
6 Ibid., 6.
7 Finlayson is aware that talk of “virtues” traditionally takes place in the context of describing the constitutive 
ingredients of a good life or human flourishing; yet, he does not think that this makes the term inapplicable (Ibid., 
7). Presumably, this is because the qualities Finlayson has in mind share with virtues as they are traditionally 
conceived that these qualities are constitutive of a certain way of life (albeit in this case a life of resistance, not the 
good life) and that they are dispositions and modes of behaviour which cannot be cashed out in terms of definite 
rules. 
8 Ibid., 6f
3would be “ossifying into moral self-righteousness.”9 
For the later discussion, it is worth noting two points which Finlayson does not 
explicitly acknowledge. Firstly, Adorno’s ethics of resistance and the virtues constitutive of it are 
historically specific—they are a reaction to the particular social evil of the modern social world and 
do not arise from a transhistorical or a priori analysis of how we should live or of the concept of 
resistance. For example, resistance to other evils might involve quite different virtues, such as 
boastfulness instead of humility. Similarly, if Adorno were to write an ethics for a free society, such 
an ethics would, presumably, also be quite different—there would be no need any more to require 
of people to resist this society, and while the three virtues might still be of importance, the list of 
virtues might be longer. Even the New Categorical Imperative is best seen as something historically 
specific in the sense that its justification lies in reacting adequately to  particular events—the 
genocide of the European Jews.10 This is, indeed, one of the points Adorno is making against Kant: 
neither the formal structure of pure practical reason, nor any other discursive grounding is suitable 
as justification.11 Moreover, while Adorno might accept the kind of constraints on action which are 
the most likely candidates for an ahistorical, minimalist ethics (such as the demands that we should 
not murder, torture or enslave others), these constraints do not exhaust his ethical perspective. In 
fact, they are not even its core. That core is made up by what is required specifically to resist the 
radical evil of the modern world, that is, on Finlayson’s reconstruction, the three virtues of 
autonomy, humility and affection.
Secondly, Adorno’s ethics, as reconstructed by Finlayson, is minimalist: Adorno does 
not subscribe to a full-blown ethics which regulates every aspect of our live and promises us the 
possibility of right or even good living, if strictly adhered to. Rather, Adorno merely subscribes to a 
“minima moralia”, to an ethics which offers limited guidance and which does not leave room for 
9 Ibid., 7; on this danger, see T.W. Adorno, Probleme der Moralphilosophie (1963), ed. by T. Schröder (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp, 1996)/translated as Problems of Moral Philosophy by R. Livingstone (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), 
lecture 16.
10 For a more detailed analysis of the New Categorical Imperative along these lines, see J.M. Bernstein, Adorno—
Disenchantment and Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Ch. 8.
11 See ND, 358/365.
4the possibility of right living.
III. The Problem of Normativity and Finlayson's proposed solution to it:
It has often been argued that Adorno cannot account for the normativity of his ethics (or, indeed, 
the normativity of his philosophy as a whole). For example, Habermas objects on two counts to 
Adorno’s critical theory.12 Firstly, he doubts that Adorno could explain the possibility of there being 
critical individuals in late capitalism, given that Adorno describes this social form as an almost 
completely “administered world [verwaltete Welt]” and “delusional system [Verblendungs-  
zusammenhang].” And, secondly, Habermas calls into question that Adorno could justify his critical 
stance towards this society. It is this second problem which is central to the discussion in this paper 
(although we will also briefly return to the first one later on). Habermas and other critics elsewhere 
speak of it in terms of Adorno’s philosophy lacking “normative foundations [normative 
Grundlagen].”13 Thus, what these critics are demanding is a justificatory account of the ethical and 
normative requirements of Adorno's theory and, according to them, this demand cannot be met 
within this theory. Call this the Problem of Normativity. 
Finlayson recognizes that this is a problem. He admits that it would be necessary to 
“(...) justify the ‘ought’ claims of his [Adorno’s] social and ethical theory (...)” and to “(...) give his 
philosophy a practical orientation to the present.”14 In particular, what would have to be justified is 
the claim that late capitalism is radically evil and in virtue of this deserves to be resisted. The worry 
of Adorno’s critics is that he could not justify this claim because he could not say that late 
capitalism is radically evil (or that this evil would deserve to be resisted) without appealing to a 
conception of the good, and he could not appeal to such a conception because of his negativism.15 A 
12 J. Habermas, Philosophical-Political Profiles, trans. by F.G. Lawrence (London: Heinemann, 1983), pp. 101-107.
13 See J. Habermas (1984), The Theory of Communicative Action, Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, 
trans. by T. McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity, 1984), p. 374; see also S. Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: a study 
of the foundations of critical theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), especially Chs. 5-6.
14 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 5.
15 Moreover, Finlayson argues (following Theunissen) that Adorno cannot (contrary to what he sometimes tries to do) 
read what ought to be (the good) from the “traces of its reflection” in what ought not to be (the bad), since this 
would conflict with Adorno’s own commitment that the negation of the a negation is not yet something positive 
(Ibid., 10).
5conception of the good (or of a suitable specific good) would be required, for example because 
otherwise we could not justify that the structurally induced domination and brutality of late 
capitalism are radically evil and deserve resistance, rather than being, say, (a) unavoidable evils 
which cannot be resisted, or (b) bads which should be tolerated because they are preferable to the 
direct domination and brutality which characterized earlier social forms, or perhaps (c) not bads 
after all.
Finlayson’s strategy in defending Adorno is to argue that the good is available within 
Adorno’s philosophy—or, to be more precise, that a specific good is available which is suitable to 
provide the normative basis of his ethics of resistance. If Finlayson is right about this, then the 
Problem of Normativity could be avoided and Adorno’s philosophy would not be guilty of this 
deep-seated incoherence after all.
The challenge which Finlayson’s defense faces is to show how such a good is available 
within Adorno’s philosophy, despite statements by Adorno which seem to suggest that no good or 
positive value whatsoever are available in the radically evil modern social world.16
Unfortunately, in his article Finlayson is oscillating between two different ways of 
meeting this challenge. Initially, Finlayson’s approach seems to consist in restricting the scope of 
Adorno’s negativism, namely, restricting it to the thesis that we cannot have conceptual access to or 
knowledge of the good (or a suitable specific good). As Finlayson writes: “One cannot think the 
good by means of concepts without identifying it and thereby doing injustice to it. (...) 
Consequently, Adorno has to seek a non-discursive or non-conceptual mode of access to the 
good.”17 One reason for attaching such a scope restriction to Adorno’s negativism could be that 
conceptualization is particularly deeply implicated in the radical evil of the modern social world, 
but the same is not true of other ways of knowing and experiencing (such as certain forms of 
aesthetic engagement with the world). Hence, according to this reinterpretation of Adorno’s 
16 See, e.g., Adorno’s remarks about the possibility of positivity after Auschwitz (ND, 354/361).
17 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 11; see also 4.
6negativism, the good exists and we can have non-conceptual access to it; the only thing we cannot 
do is to conceptualize it. The good is hidden from conceptual thought, but not necessarily from all 
forms of experiencing whatsoever.18 If Finlayson were to take this line, he would not be the only 
commentator to do so. Others before him have already, albeit less explicitly, taken this path. For 
example, there is a tendency among some commentator to ascribe to Adorno the view that we could 
gain knowledge of the good through aesthetic means.19
However, later on in the article, Finlayson seems to deny that for Adorno the good is 
given at all.20 If so, it becomes irrelevant which form (conceptual or non-conceptual) the alleged 
access to the good takes. Also, Finlayson is skeptical at this point that Adorno actually exempted 
the non-conceptual forms of knowing and experiencing (such as art) from the strictures of 
negativism. This is partly because these other practices cannot stand on their own, but for Adorno 
always require philosophical interpretation and thereby conceptualization.21 We could not know the 
good through an aesthetic presentation of it. In this sense, the idea of a non-conceptual, non-
discursive access to the good is blocked on Finlayson’s interpretation of Adorno. And this also fits 
the text better. For example, Adorno claims that even our imagination—a potential source of non-
conceptual acquaintance with the good—is so affected by the radically evil world that it cannot 
provide us with access to the good.22
In these later parts of the article Finlayson shifts to an alternative approach to meet the 
challenge of making his defense strategy compatible with Adorno’s negativism and this seems to be 
his considered view. According to this second approach, it is by undergoing the experiences of 
attempting, but failing to think the non-identical that we have access to and knowledge of a specific 
good (and this specific good is, moreover, suitable as normative basis of Adorno’s ethics). The 
18 See Ibid., 11, where Finlayson talks of the good as hidden from conceptual thought.
19 See, e.g., R. Bubner, “Kann Theorie ästhetisch werden? Zum Hauptmotiv der Philosophie Adornos,” in B. Lindner 
& M. Lüdke (eds.), Materialien zur ästhetischen Theorie Theodor W. Adornos – Konsturktion der Moderne 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1980), pp 108-137; H. Brunkhorst, Adorno and Critical Theory (Cardiff: University 
of Wales Press, 1999).
20 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 16.
21 Ibid., 17f.
22 See, e.g., ND, 345/352.
7access and knowledge is here, at least in part, conceptual, so that on this second approach Adorno’s 
negativism is not restricted in scope (as applying only to conceptualization), but in terms of its 
content: reinterpreted in this way, it says that we have not and cannot have access to the good, but 
can still have access to specific goods. Finlayson does not explicitly present his view in this way, 
but this is the best way of making sense of what he does say.
To make this second approach work as a defense strategy of Adorno, Finlayson needs to 
show (a) that Adorno does, indeed, think that we could gain access to a specific good by 
undergoing the experiences of attempting, but failing to think the non-identical, and (b) that the 
specific good in question is of the right kind to provide a normative basis of Adorno’s ethics of 
resistance. 
Finlayson's argument for for (a) is rather complex.23 The first step in this argument is 
that Finlayson makes two interpretative claims. Firstly, according to Finlayson, the main task of 
philosophy for Adorno is to think what escapes conceptual thought, that is, to think what Adorno 
refers to as the “non-identical [Nichtidentische]”, “the inexpressible [Unsagbare; 
Unausdrückliche]”, or “the non-conceptual [Begriffslose; Nichtbegriffliche]”.24 Finlayson’s guiding 
idea is that any ethics within Adorno’s theory should be compatible with this main task, or, better 
still, tightly connected to it. Secondly, Finlayson claims that what Adorno calls the “non-identical” 
is best captured by term “the ineffable.”25 In particular, this interpretation has two advantages: (1) it 
is less “prejudicial” than the other terms Adorno uses to describe what cannot be captured by 
conceptual thought; and (2) it allows us to connect Adorno’s idea of thinking the non-identical with 
other (credible) philosophical projects, such as the negative theology of Nicholas of Cusa and 
Wittgensteinian thoughts about what can be shown, but not said.26 
23 See Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 11-18.
24 Ibid., 11.
25 Ibid.
26 I will here ignore Finlayson’s comparison of Adorno’s position with De Cusa’s negative theology (Ibid., 12ff), since 
this comparison is not of importance for the critical discussion which is to follow. It mainly serves the role of 
disarming the charge of mysticism and irrationalism lodged against Adorno by his critics: Finlayson claims that de 
Cusa’s negative theology is philosophically legitimate, and then argues by analogy that insofar as Adorno’s project 
of attempting, but failing to think the ineffable is structurally similar to Cusa’s project, it is also philosophically 
8The second step is to provide a closer analysis of the ineffable and the experiences 
involved “(...) in trying to think something which eludes conceptual thought.”27 Finlayson is fairly 
open as to what the intended objects of these experiences are. Presumably, God, or the Absolute, or 
what Hegel calls the “true infinite” would be among them, but trying to think a single particular 
might also count as an attempt to think what eludes conceptual thought. Thus, there is a multiplicity 
of intended objects which could potentially be involved in the experiences in question. Finlayson is 
also open about which form these experiences will take. Some of these experiences in question 
might be aesthetic experiences,28 but what matters is that they are attempts at thinking or grasping 
what eludes conceptual thought, not first and foremost that they are aesthetic. It might well be the 
case that attempts to grasp what eludes conceptual thought could also be made in other fields—
philosophy or theology being the most likely candidates. For example, Finlayson mentions 
Adorno’s central thought of arranging concepts in a constellation in order to “(...) represent from 
without what the concepts have excised within, the ‘more’ which the concepts strives to be, and 
fails to be in equal measure.”29 Finally, Finlayson’s account of the ineffable follows A.W. Moore 
influential analysis, according to which the ineffable denotes that which cannot be expressed or 
conceptualized or uttered as a matter of principle.30 Any attempts to think what eludes conceptual 
thought are inevitably bound to fail. In a nutshell, the reason for this is that thinking requires 
conceptualization and with the latter comes the possibility of articulation, so that thinking the in-
principle-inexpressible is impossible.  
This final point has an important implication: whatever value is at issue in the 
experiences involved in thinking what eludes conceptual thought, it cannot be that the value or 
good is ineffable and we have insight into it. Rather, the value or goodness involved must consist 




29 ND, 164/162; quoted in Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 15.
30 Ibid., 14; with references. See especially A.W. Moore, Points of View (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) p. 148.
9this and insists on it.31 In fact, he proposes that the value in question lies in the goodness of 
recognizing our human finitude which the experiences in question demonstrate to us. Thus, strictly 
speaking, we do not gain access to goodness by having insight into an ineffable, hidden good. 
Rather, the experiential states of the failed attempts to gain insights into the ineffable are what are 
valuable, and the access to goodness is, hence, undergoing these experiences. 
These experiential states are, at least in part, conceptual—while what we aimed to say 
cannot be put into words, that we are shown something in this (failed) attempts to express the 
ineffable can be put into words.32 We can describe that we are shown something and what this 
experience is like. In fact, we can even speak of knowledge in this context (at least, “broadly 
speaking”),33 since we make some cognitive advance in attempting to grasp what eludes conceptual 
thought. We might not have learned something about the nature of the intended objects of our failed 
attempts to grasp the ineffable (such as God, or true infinity, or the single particular), but in the 
process we learned something about the finitude and nature of human cognition itself. In this sense, 
Finlayson does talk of “ineffable insights”, but what he means is not “insights into the ineffable”, 
but insights which are gained from trying (but inevitably failing) to think the ineffable. (Throughout 
this paper, I follow Finlayson in understanding “ineffable insights” in this way).
The next step in the argument is that Finlayson makes a further interpretative claim: 
having experiences and gaining knowledge is valuable for Adorno, either instrumentally or 
intrinsically.34 In particular, the positive value in question consists in happiness: cognitive 
experiences are connected to happiness, either intrinsically (in being happy states) or instrumentally 
(in enabling us to do things which satisfy our desires and thereby give rise to happiness).
31 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 16.
32 Ibid., 15.
33 Ibid., 14.
34 Ibid., 16f. Unfortunately, Finlayson misidentifies the source of the key quotation on which his interpretation rests—
it is not to be found in Ästhetische Theorie, as Finlayson claims (ibid., 16), but instead is in “Resignation” [1969] 
(reprinted in T.W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften, 20 Vols., ed. by G. Adorno & R. Tiedemann (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1973-1986), 10.2:798f; henceforth “GS”). Also, there is room for disagreement about his interpretation 
of this passage. Still, the view that knowledge is valuable is independently plausible, and I will not press this matter 
further, other than mentioning a different interpretation in passing below (in note 43).
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Moreover, according to Finlayson, trying to think the ineffable fulfills no instrumental 
goal and, in fact, could not fulfill any such goal, since the nature of the relevant experiences is 
insufficiently transparent for any instrumental purpose: unlike other forms of cognition, these 
experiences tell us only about the state of knowledge, not what the knowledge is good for.35 Yet, 
since all experiences and forms of gaining knowledge are valuable in one of the two ways for 
Adorno, the experiences involved must then be intrinsically valuable for him. 
This leaves Finlayson’s with the task (b): showing that this specific intrinsic good is 
suitable as a “normative basis of an ethics of resistance.”36 Here the argument is much more 
straightforward. According to Finlayson, the goodness of experiences involved in trying, but failing 
to think what eludes conceptual thought is suitable to underwrite Adorno’s ethics of resistance 
because the three virtues constitutive of this ethics are also constitutive of these experiences. Thus, 
gaining ineffable insights, the experience of being shown something, requires that one is not just 
passive, but actively makes use of one’s disposition for and capacity of critical reflection, that is, 
that one exercises one’s autonomy. Similarly, the virtue of humility links up with the idea of 
epistemological modesty which arises from the attempt to think the ineffable; and the capacity for 
affection involves the same kind of receptivity and sensibility as is required for being shown 
something.
In sum, Finlayson aligns Adorno’s notion of the non-identical with the notion of the 
ineffable and points to the value of the experiences involved in the failed attempts to think it. 
Moreover, he shows how this value relates to the three virtues and thereby can serve as the 
normative basis of Adorno’s ethics of resistance. In this way, Finlayson seems to have rescued 
Adorno’s ethics from the danger of incoherence. 
The advantage of this way of underwriting Adorno’s normative ethics is that there is a 
clear link between his ethics and his concern with thinking the non-identical (interpreted by 
35 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 17.
36 Ibid., 18.
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Finlayson, as thinking the ineffable). In other words, there is a connection between Adorno’s 
theoretical and practical philosophy. In fact, in a certain sense, on Finlayson’s proposal it would be 
Adorno’s theoretical philosophy that underwrites his practical philosophy: the 'happiness of 
knowledge' [Glück der Erkenntnis] derived from certain experiences functions as the normative 
basis of Adorno’s ethics and the epistemic virtues involved in such experiences double up as ethical 
ones.
IV. Critique of Finlayson’s proposal taken as a justificatory account
The step of Finlayson’s argument on which I want to focus my critique is the crucial final one. 
Thus, for the sake of argument, I grant Finlayson that Adorno’s non-identical can be equated with 
the ineffable and his claim that for Adorno the experience of attempting, but inevitably failing to 
gain knowledge of it is valuable. In general, I here leave concerns about textual matters (largely) 
aside and concentrate on the philosophical issues instead. 
There are two reasons for thinking that Finlayson’s proposed solution is unpromising as 
a justificatory account. Both of these cast doubt on the possibility that the specific intrinsic value 
(or good) gained through ineffable experiences is suitable as normative basis of Adorno’s ethics. 
Firstly, recall that the ineffable is that which it is as a matter of principle impossible to 
put into words and to gain insight into. Attempts to think or grasp the ineffable will always fail. The 
goodness involved in such failed attempts is, hence, something which would occur in any society 
and at any point of history. It has nothing specifically to do with the modern social world and its 
forms of thought. This shows that the value which allegedly arises from the failed attempts of 
thinking the ineffable is not of the right kind to underwrite Adorno’s ethics qua ethics which 
requires us to oppose a particular, historically developed social world. Finlayson’s proposal is 
unsuitable as a justificatory account because the goodness of ineffable experiences does not relate 
or contrast to the radical evil of late capitalism in a way which would ground resistance to the latter. 
This historically specific radical evil does not consist in blocking insights into the ineffable—in 
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fact, it cannot consist in this, since such insights are in principle blocked. 
Secondly, even if one granted that the value of having ineffable insights provides a 
normative basis for the three virtues contained in the ethics of resistance, it does not provide such a 
basis for them as ethical qualities, but merely as epistemic ones and as constitutive of a certain form 
of experiencing. Nothing which Finlayson says shows that Adorno’s theoretical philosophy could 
underwrite (in the sense of justify) his practical philosophy. The fact that certain dispositions are 
connected to a valuable experiential state is not a justification for practicing these virtues in a 
different context—the context of deciding how to act in ethical situations. It is unlikely that the 
valuable experiential states will occur in this different context, and even if they did, this occurrence 
by itself would not be a justification. At most, Finlayson’s proposal could explain that we cannot 
but act in certain ways once we have acquired these dispositions, but that by itself would not justify 
acting in such ways.
There are three ways in which Finlayson (or those defending his proposal) could 
respond to these objections. Firstly, one of the things to which Adorno objects is that life in the 
modern social world has led to a narrower set of experiences—our experiences have become more 
uniform and regimented. In fact, if Adorno is to be believed, the very ability to make unrestricted 
experiences (that is, the ability to remain open to be formed by the object of experience rather than 
forming it according to some preconceived conceptual scheme) is being progressively undermined 
by the culture industry and other aspects of the modern social world (such as the repetitive and 
impoverished nature of many occupations). Perhaps, this means that the modern social world also 
blocks the experiences of attempting but failing to grasp the ineffable. In this way, one could say 
that this social world blocks the goodness associated with these experiences and that it is in this 
sense bad (and worthy of being resisted).37
37 This reply could be strengthen further if Finlayson dropped his equation of the ineffable with the non-identical. 
Thus, instead of interpreting Adorno as saying that the non-identical is that which is in principle ineffable (as 
Finlayson proposes), one could interpret Adorno as saying that the non-identical is that which cannot be captured 
within the conceptual framework of modern rationality. Then it might be true that one of the things which make up 
the evil of capitalism is the badness of the fact that the modern world and mode of rationality block the possibility 
of unrestricted experience of the non-identical. This badness would be specific to capitalism, and as such it would 
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However, even if so, this would not be all what is evil about this social world for 
Adorno, or even what is mainly evil about it. To forego the goodness of certain experiences seems 
of rather peripheral importance if what is at stake is avoiding the reoccurrence of torture and 
genocide. Consequently, the idea that the social world blocks the goodness associated with the 
experiences of ineffable insights cannot really do the main justificatory work for Adorno’s ethics of 
resistance. Moreover, the key rationale for this ethics, as identified by Finlayson, was to prevent 
another Auschwitz from happening, not to reinstate the capacity for unrestricted experiences. 
Admittedly, one way to prevent the reoccurrence of Auschwitz might be to prevent a further 
restriction of experiences (since such a restriction might have been partly responsible for the 
bourgeois coldness which made Auschwitz possible in the first place). Still, this would then follow 
as a specific prescription from the New Categorical Imperative, rather than justify this imperative 
and the ethics of which it is part.
Alternatively, Finlayson could argue against the charge that his proposal is 
insufficiently historically specific to capture Adorno’s ethics by re-interpreting this ethics as merely 
consisting in a transhistorical moral minimalism.38 In particular, he could emphasize a sense in 
which the New Categorical Imperative is not historically specific: its content, on this interpretation, 
is meant to hold for the future, even if it is indexed to a particular historical event. 
However, not only would this reply be highly implausible as a reading of Adorno’s 
texts, it would also not be convincing as philosophical position. The goodness of the experiences 
involved in ineffable insights would still be of the wrong sort for a justificatory account of 
normativity of Adorno’s ethics: the value of being shown something about the finitude of human 
cognition does not seem suitable as key to an account of the ethical demands of moral minimalism
—for example, it is implausible to suggest that the demand not to torture derives from this value. 
be at least a suitable candidate for underpinning Adorno’s historically specific ethics of resistance. However, it 
would be overly reductionist to suggest that the normativity at issue is exhausted in the badness of the modern 
conceptual framework. Any account of the normativity of Adorno’s ethical perspective has to be wider, and, hence, 
even the revised version of Finlayson’s proposal is unsatisfactory.
38 Finlayson suggested this rejoinder in response to an earlier version of this paper (08/09/2007).
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Also, a transhistorical interpretation would be committed to the claim that resistance as such 
requires the virtues of humility, autonomy and affection, and validating this claim would be a tall 
order—as mentioned before, resistance might well require the opposite of humility in certain 
circumstances. Moreover, the justification of the New Categorical Imperative should not be 
understood as independent of the particular events to which it explicitly refers—this would be to 
overlook Adorno’s very purpose in formulating a New Categorical Imperative against Kant’s 
conception of the categorical imperative and strategy of justifying it. Consequently, even this 
second line of reply is unconvincing. 
As a final reply, Finlayson could argue that my objections overlook that the value of 
becoming aware of the finitude and limits of the human cognitive capacities is of particular 
importance in the context of modern society and rationality. It is one of the central theses of Adorno 
that this society and rationality have led to a particular disregard of the non-identical—with the full 
development of capitalist production, the natural sciences, and modern instrumental rationality, the 
non-identical is much more systematically and thoroughly disregarded than would have been 
possible under any earlier social form. In this sense, we can cash out the historically specific evil of 
the modern social world in terms of the heightened disregard of the non-identical which is 
characteristic of this world and its dominant thought form (i.e., what Adorno calls “identity 
thinking” [Identitätsdenken]). Similarly, we can base the historically specific ethics of resistance on 
the goodness of the experience of having ineffable insights, since this goodness can act as a 
counterweight against the heightened disregard of the non-identical. After Auschwitz, we have a 
special need for this kind of experience, even if it might well have been around forever. In this 
sense, Finlayson’s proposal can cater for the historic specific sense of the ethics of resistance after 
all. 
This might look like the most promising reply, but it cannot rescue Finlayson’s 
proposal, at least not as a justificatory account. Firstly, the goodness of the experiences involved in 
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the insights gained from trying, but failing to think the ineffable might perhaps act as a 
counterweight to the badness of the heightened disregard of the non-identical in our times, but it is 
not suitable as justification for why this disregard is bad or why modern society is evil in virtue of 
leading to more of such disregard than ever before. The fact that we might have a specific historic 
need for such experiences (and the goodness they entail) presupposes, rather than shows, that 
something has gone amiss in the modern world. Moreover, the goodness of the experiences is, even 
on this reading, too limited to underwrite Adorno's ethics. The only way it could function as a 
justification of this ethics would be to commit Finlayson to a reductionist account of Adorno’s 
conception of badness, that is, to the view that all what is bad about the modern social world is that 
it makes us forgo the goodness of certain experiences and especially so, when compared to earlier 
social worlds. As seen in my rejoinder to the first response, this view is implausible and it does not 
fit Finlayson’s own characterization of the Adorno’s ethics, which emphasizes the New Categorical 
Imperative as its key rationale. Thus, the specific good to which Finlayson points is neither suitable 
as the normative basis of Adorno's ethics, nor of the badness of the heightened disregard of the non-
identical in modern times—at best it is a medicine to what would have to be already recognized 
(and justified) as an illness of the modern age.
Still, this third line of reply suggests a strategy in which Finlayson’s proposal could 
perhaps be salvaged. There are at least two different ways in which we can understand the demand 
for an account of normativity: as (a) a justificatory account or as (b) an explanatory one. According 
to the first of the two models, often adopted by Kantians, an account of the normativity of, say, an 
ethical theory would consist in providing justificatory grounds for the requirements of this theory—
for example, in Kant's own case, these requirements derive their normative force from pure 
practical reason. In contrast to this, proponents of an explanatory account of normativity would 
reject the demand for such a justification, for example, as the outgrowth of modern enlightenment 
thinking and as having led to skepticism about moral demands.39 Instead, an explanatory account of 
39 See, e.g., A. MacIntyre, After Virtue: a study in moral theory (London: Duckworth, [1981], second edition 1985), 
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normativity would consist in showing how certain considerations would have normative force for 
us because, for example, we have been brought up well and see the world in the appropriate light, 
or because we have certain sentiments. Yet, showing this would not justify the normative force in 
question—the theorists of this school of thought (often Aristotelians or Humeans) would admit that 
the fact that, for example, human beings attach negative normative force to pain or suffering does 
not mean that this is something which any rational being would have to accept. Still, these theorists 
would not think that admitting to this lack of justification would be a problem for their view—a 
justification at the level of the sources of normativity is for them impossible and unnecessary. 
Maybe, Finlayson's proposal could function as an explanatory account. It would then 
have to help explain how and why people (or, at least, those who were lucky enough to have been 
well-brought up) would recognize the ought claims of Adorno’s philosophy as binding and 
orientate their lives accordingly. 
Admittedly, Finlayson seems to set out to provide a justificatory account and Adorno’s 
critics often demand such an account, but an explanatory account could be of use in defending 
Adorno in a different way. Firstly, there is also an explanatory lacuna in his theory: as we seen 
earlier, the critics (such as Habermas) worry about both (a) the normative foundations of Adorno’s 
critical theory (what I call the Problem of Normativity) and (b) how anyone might be able to act 
according to this theory and its ethical demands. Perhaps, Finlayson’s proposal has merit as a 
response to (b). After all, Adorno's negativism seems to present him with a problem here too. For 
example, Adorno’s critics argue that without a conception of the good (or of a suitable specific 
good) people could not recognize the evil for what it is, since to do so requires a contrast class and 
only such a conception could fulfill this role.40 
Secondly, there is some reason to think that Adorno himself might not have accepted 
Chs. 5-6.
40 See, e.g., M. Theunissen, “Negativität bei Adorno,” in: v. Friedeburg & Habermas (eds.) (1983), Adorno-Konferenz 
1983, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), pp. 41-65.; see also M. Seel, Adornos Philosophie der Kontemplation 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 2004), p. 22. (Neither Theunissen, nor Seel distinguish between explanatory and 
justificatory accounts.)
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the critics’s demand for a justificatory account. After all, he was skeptical of the success of (and 
need for) “discursive grounding.”41 Thus, an explanatory account could be more in Adorno’s spirit, 
though it would not satisfy his critics, unless further arguments would be provided for why a 
justificatory account is, indeed, unnecessary.
V. Critique of Finlayson  ’s proposal taken as explanatory account  
Finlayson’s account might be read as an explanation of how we might acquire (and nourish) the 
three virtues which he identifies as constitutive of Adorno’s ethics. Thus, it might be a fortunate, 
but predictable side-effect of the goodness of having ineffable insights that people develop the three 
virtues in question, which then can also be used for a life of resistance. What are initially epistemic 
virtues could double up as ethical ones in this way—once the virtues are acquired within one 
context, they could be exercised more generally. As long as this account is meant to be explanatory 
only (and not also to justify the extended exercise of the virtues), this seems promising. In fact, it is 
often the nature of dispositions and character traits that they tend to influence all aspects of one’s 
behavior, rather than being something we switch one and off. Similarly, if the take the alleged fact 
that attempting, but failing to grasp the ineffable is a valuable and pleasurable experience, then we 
might be able to explain why some people do not despair in this radically evil world, but cling on to 
the hope that a different world is possible and live a life of resistance.42 And the goodness of this 
experience can be a source of dissatisfaction with identity thinking, since the latter deprives us of 
such experiences. In this way, Finlayson’s proposal could be seen to provide at least an indirect 
explanation for why individuals may come to view the ought claims of Adorno’s ethics as 
compelling and use them for practical orientation. What Finlayson would be demonstrating is that 
the experiences of attempting, but failing to grasp the ineffable might lead us to have dispositions of 
the sort also constitutive of Adorno’s ethics of resistance.
41 See, e.g., ND 358/365.
42 In fact, this might be what Adorno has in mind in the passage which is key to Finlayson’s reading and in which 
Adorno talks about the happiness of knowledge (see “Resignation” [1969], GS, 10.2:798f).
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This way of reading Finlayson’s proposal is highly reconstructive—it is not clear that 
this is what he wants to say, and, as seen, his language points to a different project than what might 
be called an “aetiology of the three virtues” (that is, a study of their causes).43 Still, it looks more 
promising to take it in this latter sense than to read it as a justificatory account, and, perhaps, in this 
way Finlayson’s interesting reading of Adorno’s philosophy can be rescued.
However, there are also reasons to be skeptical about the success of this alternative way 
of taking Finlayson’s proposal. Firstly, it seems highly unlikely that (failed) attempts at grasping 
the ineffable would actually function as a way of building up the virtues for a life of resistance—
after all, trying to grasp the ineffable is quite an esoteric pursuit in the first place. Still, this is not 
decisive, since Adorno is not very confident that many people would be able to live a life of 
resistance and he might accept that it only results from esoteric pursuits, such as trying to grasp the 
ineffable. Also, explaining how there could be even the mere possibility of living such a life would 
be an advance on the view painted by his critics. Yet, there are more damaging worries.
Thus, secondly, it is not clear that making the experiences in question does not already 
presuppose the three virtues, rather than being a way of developing them. How could we be shown 
something, if we do not engage in critical reflection, if we are not open to recognize our finitude, 
and if we are not receptive? In reply, one might argue that any account of virtues will be circular to 
some extent, but this need not mean that it is viciously circular. Thus, only by acting rightly will we 
develop right dispositions and only by having the right dispositions will we act rightly. However, 
this reply is problematic, since it leaves out a crucial step of the traditional account. The traditional 
account is not strictly circular: one is habituated into acting in accordance with virtues, but only 
later begins to recognize the reasons for why it is virtuous to act in this way, and it is only at that 
point that one actually becomes virtuous. It is hard to see what the equivalent to the habituation step 
would be in Finlayson’s account. Moreover, who would guide this habituation in a radically evil 
43 Finlayson suggested this description of his proposal in conversation to me (08/09/2007). 
19
and delusional world? While Adorno sometimes speaks of people becoming critical by sheer luck,44 
nothing in Finlayson’s proposal increases the plausibility of this claim.
Finally, the materialist dimension of Adorno’s philosophy gets somewhat lost in 
Finlayson’s reconstruction of it. For Adorno, it is suffering which is the “engine of dialectical 
thought” and the abhorrence of it which is the “materialistic motive” in which alone “morality 
survives.”45 In this sense, one might expect that suffering would have to play an important role in 
explaining why people turned to a life of resistance, why they started to think critically, became 
wary of self-righteousness, and developed the capacity to be moved by the fate of others. Yet, these 
materialistic explanatory grounds are neglected by Finlayson’s proposal, and this detracts from its 
suitability as an Adornian aetiology of a life of resistance and the three virtues.
In sum, even as an explanatory account, Finlayson’s proposal is, at best, incomplete, 
and, at worst, unsuccessful.
VI. Alternative responses to the Problem of Normativity
The immediate question is whether there might be another way to solve the Problem of 
Normativity, or whether the failure of Finlayson’s defense strategy means that Adorno is guilty as 
charged and his ethics is subject to a deep-seated incoherence. 
Recall the Problem of Normativity, which can be formalized as follows:
(1) Adorno subscribes to an ethics of resistance and in virtue of this his philosophy is normative.
(2) Accounting for normativity requires the availability of a positive conception of the good (or of a 
suitable specific good), that is, it requires that we know what the good is (or what the specific good in 
question is) and that we can make appeal to it in the course of providing such an account.
(3) Within Adorno’s philosophy, a positive conception of the good (or, even, of a specific good) is 
unavailable. [“Adorno’s negativism”]
(4) From (2) and (3), Adorno’s philosophy cannot be normative.
(5) From (1) and (4), Adorno’s philosophy both is and cannot be normative.
We can identify four general ways in which one might respond to it. Firstly, one could reject 
premise (1) and deny that Adorno’s philosophy contains a normative ethics. If defensible as an 
44 See, e.g., ND, 51/41.
45 ND, 202, 358/202, 365.
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interpretation, then the Problem of Normativity does not even arise—for there is no ethics whose 
normativity needs accounting for.46 Secondly, one might try to make the good available within 
Adorno’s philosophy and despite his negativism, and, thus, reject or qualify premise (3). This 
defense strategy is, in effect, the one which Finlayson aimed for, but there might be alternative 
ways to carry it out.47 Thirdly, one might call into question the inference from premises (2) and (3) 
to the interim conclusion (4). In particular, one could adopt what might be called a “context-
dependent” approach to accounting for normativity, according to which no general account of 
normativity is possible (or desirable) and the Problem of Normativity is misconceived.48 Finally, 
one could reject premise (2). This is what might be called the “negativistic strategy”, and here the 
idea is that access or appeal to the good is not necessary for accounting for all forms of normativity
—the reason-giving force of Adorno’s ethics can be accounted simply by appealing and knowing 
what the bad (or the worst) is. 
For various reasons, I think that the negativistic option is the most promising defense 
strategy. To argue for this would require more space than I have available here, so that it will have 
to suffice to disarm three immediate objections to it. In fact, these objections are already articulated 
in Finlayson’s original article and taking them up, thus, completes the critical discussion of it. 
The first objection is that a purely negativistic account would not be able to offer 
sufficient practical guidance or provide the kind of “constraints on individual action we typically 
expect from a normative ethical theory.”49 The upshot of this would presumably be that either the 
negativistic account could not underwrite Adorno’s ethics, or what it could underwrite would not be 
an ethics.
In reply, it is important to note that one need not claim that a purely negativistic account 
46 However, as I have argued elsewhere, this interpretation is not defensible (see my “No Easy Way Out: Adorno”s 
Negativism and the Problem of Normativity,” in S. Giacchetti (ed.), Nostalgia for a Redeemed Future: Critical  
Theory (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 2008), pp. 39-50). 
47 See, e.g., Seel, Adornos Philosophie der Kontemplation.
48 See, e.g., R. Geuss (1996), “Morality and Identity,” in C. Korsgaard et al., The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 189-199.
49 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 9.
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could provide the normative basis for any ethics, but merely that it can underwrite all the practical 
guidance and constraints which Adorno’s minimalist ethics contains. For a start, this guidance is 
only limited and unlike what we typically expect from a normative ethical theory—hence, we 
cannot use the latter as a standard to evaluate the former. Adorno’s ethics, even according to 
Finlayson’s own reconstruction, is not a full-blown morality which governs or constraints every 
action (such as Utilitarianism or Kantian morality). The limited character of Adorno’s ethics tallies 
well with the limited character of a negativistic normative basis—in fact, one could argue that one 
of the reasons why Adorno’s ethics is minimal in its guidance is because of his negativism. 
Moreover, and quite independently of Adorno’s philosophy, it is unclear why a purely 
negativistic ethics should not be able to provide most of the central constraints on individual action. 
If anything, it is this area of ethics that a negativistic account is best suited for, as the long tradition 
of minimalism shows: to require that people should not murder, rape, torture, or enslave others is 
something for which we need not appeal to the good or some instance of intrinsic goodness; here, 
clearly, the negative normative force of the intrinsic badness of such actions suffices. Thus, even 
though Adorno’s ethics goes beyond the minimalism just described, there is no reason in principle 
to think that a negativistic approach to this ethics could not underwrite any constraints on individual 
action. 
The second objection is that the three virtues of Adorno’s ethics would only be 
instrumentally valuable on a purely negativistic account and as such part of the very context of 
fungibility which makes up the radically evil social world.50 In this sense, a negativistic account of 
Adorno’s ethics would be self-defeating insofar as it would be guilty of the very thing it says we 
should resist.
In response, one might doubt that everything which is instrumentally valuable is thereby 
already part of the context of fungibility and, hence, bad for Adorno. More importantly, the virtues 
need not be merely instrumental for, but can also be constitutive of a life of resistance even on a 
50 Ibid., 9f.
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purely negativistic account: radical evil is to be resisted because of its intrinsic badness and to resist 
it just is to demonstrate autonomy, humility and affection. Either these personal qualities are merely 
instrumental to what we should do and not real virtues, or they are also constitutive of what we 
should do and in this respect proper virtues; but, if the latter, then this is so whether or not what we 
should do is cashed out only in terms of avoidance of the bad or by invoking the good (or a good). 
True, the issue of what is constitutive to a life of resistance is dependent on the issue of the source 
of its normativity in a certain way: what is the constitutive content of a life of resistance depends on 
the source and will vary relative to it, including relative to its polarity (it might, for example, be 
more minimal or less so, depending on whether the source is solely negative or not). However, this 
dependence does not exclude negativism, for that something is constitutive of such a life is not 
dependent on the polarity of the source, but just an expression of what this source requires. To 
illustrate this point, think back to the New Categorical Imperative: Adorno is claiming that the evil 
of Auschwitz by itself demands that nothing similar should happen ever again. One thing we can do 
as individuals is to live our lives in such a way that at least we ourselves do not become perpetrators 
of such evil. For this, we need to exercise the three virtues of autonomy, humility and affection. 
Yet, these virtues are not just useful for this purpose, but also its realization: if we virtuous in this 
way, we will neither be one of the torturers, nor become a Schreibtischtäter like Eichmann.
To clarify further; the form which resistance will take, and thereby also what is 
constitutive of a particular form of resistance, depends on what is being resisted. To resist 
temptation is different to resisting a social regime, and what makes them different is the different 
object of resistance. If Adorno’s analysis of the modern social world and Finlayson’s reconstruction 
of this analysis are correct, then resistance to it consists in exercising the three virtues of autonomy, 
humility and affection (just as resisting temptation might consist in being non-emotional). There are 
not merely the means to such resistance, since only by exercising them do we resist properly 
speaking (just as being non-emotional need not be merely the means to resisting temptation, but 
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also constitutive of it). This is not to say that one could not also behave in resistance-conforming 
ways accidentally or without possessing the virtues—merely that such continent behavior would 
not constitute resistance properly speaking, even though it sometimes would have the same result. 
Thus, to take an example from Adorno,51 one could refuse to go to the cinema since one could 
object to being subjected to another piece of conformity-inducing entertainment, or one could 
refuse to go because one is too tired after a long day of doing one’s best to keep the capitalist 
machine running—the latter might happen to avoid a bad, but it is not an act of resistance, properly 
speaking.
This leaves the third objection. Here, the argument is that negativistic accounts tend to 
cash out the radical evil of the modern world in terms of the suffering it causes.52 However, this 
seems unsuitable as account of the normativity of Adorno’s ethics, since (a) not all pains (or 
suffering) are bad (think of the pain involved in dental surgery—here the pain is often the necessary 
means to something good, such as less pain in the future); and (b) not all badness to which Adorno 
points can be reduced to painfulness or suffering—whatever is bad, for example, about the culture 
industry is not bad, or not bad primarily, because of the suffering it might cause.53 
It is not obvious that the view of the badness of pain suggested in this objection is 
accurate. One might instead think that all pain (and suffering) is prima facie bad, but not all pain is 
bad all things considered. This makes better sense of the dentist example (and also more generally): 
the pain involved in dental surgery should be acknowledged as a bad (especially when one adopts 
an Adornian perspective), even if—all things considered—we are willing to tolerate or endure it.54 
Moreover, independently of this different view of the badness of pain, a purely 
51 See, e.g., ND 249/168.
52 See, e.g., U. Kohlmann, Dialektik der Moral – Untersuchungen zur Moralphilosophie Adornos (Lüneburg: zu 
Klampen, 1997)
53 Finlayson, “Adorno on the Ethical and the Ineffable,” 21f n.23.
54 Is the case of someone who finds pleasure in experiencing pain (such as a masochist) a counterexample to this 
view? I am not convinced that it is, since one could account for it in two ways: either a masochist would, at least on 
reflection, acknowledge the prima facie badness of pain, but insist (perhaps wrongly) on it being pleasurable to 
endure the badness of pain (e.g. because it is enjoyable to exercise our ability of endurance); or, alternatively, a 
masochist, on this view of pain, has a deranged conception of pain insofar as he/she shows an inadequate response 
to it. 
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negativistic account need anyway not be monolithic and reduce everything to the badness of pain, 
but can (and should) acknowledge a plurality of bads. Nothing in the idea of negativism prevents 
one from doing so—in fact, it is one of the attractions of Adorno’s particular form of negativism 
that he is attentive to the different kinds of badness and their complex relationship with human 
suffering. The fault to which Finlayson points is not one of the negativistic approach as such or of 
Adorno’s version of it, but the fault of a too simple version of such an approach.
VII. C  onclusion  
While those wanting to understand Adorno’s ethics have much to thank Finlayson for his account 
of it, I have argued that, ultimately, his proposed solution to the Problem of Normativity is 
unsuccessful. The happiness of having ineffable insights is suitable neither as normative basis of 
Adorno’s ethics, nor as an aetiology of the qualities involved in exercising this ethics. Yet, 
Finlayson has, nonetheless, pointed the way for those who want to defend Adorno and address this 
problem. I have suggested that a negativistic strategy might be the best approach for achieving this 
aim, but much more needs to be said to validate this suggestion. The negativistic strategy would 
have to be situated within the debate between justificatory and explanatory accounts of normativity; 
one would need to show how it relates to Adorno’s concern with the non-identical; and it would 
need to contain a plausible, pluralist conception of badness. But these are tasks for another 
occasion.
